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Hartford Ins. v . . Manor 
Inti: 
STATE'S DUTY TO 
PROTECT AGAINST 
THIRD PARTY 
INJURIES DOES 
NOT OVERRIDE 
RECOGNIZED 
TORT LAW 
PRINCIPLE OF 
INTERVENING 
CAUSATION IN 
NEGLIGENCE 
ACTIONS. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In Hartford Ins. Co. v. 
Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135,642 
A.2d 219 (1994), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland examined 
proximate and superseding cau-
sation particularly as they relate 
to the State's duty to protect 
against third party injuries. In a 
unanimous decision, the court 
determined that, notwithstand-
ing the State's duty to protect 
against third party injuries, lia-
bility rightfully attaches to the 
individual whose acts amount 
to the superseding, intervening 
events which break the chain of 
proximate causation. Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the 
general tort law principle that 
superseding, intervening forces 
or events sever the chain oflegal 
or proximate causation such that 
liability ceases to attach to the 
original tortfeasor. 
Robert Wewer 
("Wewer") sustained personal 
injuries and property damage 
when his vehicle collided with 
another vehicle operated by 
Robert Lee Griffin ("Griffin"), 
an escaped mental patient of 
Springfield State Hospital 
("Springfield"), the mental in-
stitution to which Griffin had 
been involuntarily committed. 
Griffin had stolen the vehicle 
after an employee of Manor Inn 
("Hotel") left the vehicle unat-
tended with the doors unlocked 
and the keys in the ignition. 
Having fully paid Wewer' s sub-
sequent insurance claim, Hart-
ford Insurance Company ("In-
surer") brought a subrogation 
claim against the State and the 
hotel to recover damages paid 
on behalf of Wewer. Finding no 
material facts in dispute, the 
trial court granted the State's 
motion for summary judgment. 
Moreover, the court, suasponte, 
entered summary judgment in 
favor of the hotel. 
Finding no error, the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the decision 
ofthe trial court. Subsequently, 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land granted certiorari to con-
sider whether the state had a 
duty to protect Wewer from the 
collision which resulted as the 
unforeseeable consequence of 
Griffin's escape and whether the 
hotel employee's negligence in 
leaving the van unattended was 
the proximate cause ofW ewer's 
InJunes. 
Before addressing these 
questions, the court confronted 
the threshold issue of whether 
the trial court could sua sponte 
enter summary judgment in fa-
vor of the hotel when neither the 
insurer nor the hotel moved for 
summary judgment. The court 
first noted that the purpose of 
the summary judgment proce-
dure is to decide whether there 
is an issue of fact sufficiently 
material to be tried. Hartford 
Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 
135, 144, 642 A.2d 219, 224 
(1994). The court then focused 
on Maryland Rule 2-50 1 (e) and 
considered whether the trial 
court properly entered summa-
ry judgment in favor of one par-
ty against another absent a mo-
tion by a moving party. In rele-
vant part, Rule 2-501(e) pro-
vides: 
Upon motion of a party, the 
________________________ 25.2 /U. Bait. L.f. - 59 
court shall enter judgment in 
favor of the [moving] party if 
the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, admis-
sions and affidavits show that 
there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Id at 146,642 A.2d at 224. 
Acknowledging the tri-
al court's error in granting sum-
mary judgment, the court nev-
ertheless decided the issue as to 
the hotel's liability "to avoid 
the expense and delay of anoth-
er appeal." Id at 147,642 A.2d 
at 225. Remarking that the trial 
record was void of any motion 
for summary judgment by the 
hotel, the court of appeals con-
cluded that such failure to move 
for summary judgment amount-
ed to a tactical decision by the 
hotel. Id The court reasoned 
that had the matter been re-
versed, the hotel "would simply 
file a motion for summary judg-
ment against the [insurer] and a 
second appeal presenting the 
same issue between those par-
ties would be almost inevita-
ble." Id. Hence, the court held 
that the action of the trial court 
amounted to harmless error for 
which reversal would be im-
practical. 
The court of appeals 
next considered whether the 
state had a duty to protect 
Wewer from the collision which 
resulted as the unforeseeable 
consequence of Griffin , s escape 
from Springfield. In addition, 
the court considered whether 
the hotel employee's negligence 
in leaving the vehicle unattend-
ed was the proximate cause of 
Wewer's injuries. After exam-
ining each issue, the court found 
the State had no duty to protect 
Wewer from the collision be-
cause the collision was not a 
foreseeable consequence of 
Griffin's elopement from 
Springfield. Moreover, the court 
found the hotel employee's neg-
ligence in leaving the vehicle 
unattended was not the proxi-
mate cause ofW ewer's injuries. 
In addressing whether 
the state breached a duty owed 
to Wewer by failing to control 
Griffin's conduct, the court re-
lied onAshburnv. AnneArundel 
County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 
1078 (1986). Id at 150, 642 
A.2d at 226. In Ashburn, the 
court held that, absent a "spe-
cial relationship" either between 
the actor and the third person or 
between the actor and the per-
son injured, there existed no 
duty to control the conduct ofa 
third person. Id. (citing 
Ashburn, 306 Md. at 628, 510 
A.2d at 1083). Moreover, the 
court of appeals reaffirmed its 
adoption of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts Section 315, 
which addresses the duty of 
those in charge of persons hav-
ing dangerous propensities, fur-
ther providing an exception to 
the general duty rule. Noting 
the exception's particular appli-
cability to custodial situations, 
the court concluded that a spe-
cial relationship existed between 
Griffin and the State while he 
was in the State's custody as a 
patient at Springfield. The court 
further considered whether such 
----------------. 
= 
relationship continued follow-
ing Griffin's escape. I d at 151, 
642 A.2d at 227. 
The court opined that to 
hold the State liable for its neg-
ligent conduct in failing to con-
trol or detain Griffin would 
amount to holding the State lia-
ble for the unreasonably remote 
consequences of Griffin's own 
negligence. Id The court fur-
ther explained that "it could not 
be foreseen that Griffin, having 
eloped, would . . . steal a van, 
and drive it negligently, thus 
causing an accident." Id Rec-
ognizing the inappropriateness 
of holding the State liable for 
remote and unforeseeable con-
sequences, the court further ap-
plied the foreseeability analyses 
set forth in the seminal cases of 
Palsgraj v. Long Island R.R. 
Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) 
and Tarasoff v. Regents oj the 
Univ. oj Cal., 551 P.2d 334 
(Cal. 1976). The court ulti-
mately concluded that a duty 
would only be found in favor of 
readily identifiable plaintiffs, i. e., 
those within a foreseeable zone 
of danger whose identities are 
known in advance. Hartford, 
335 Md. at 154, 642 A.2d at 
228. 
Moreover, in its analy-
sis of the hotel's liability for 
injuries to Wewer, the court 
determined that the insurer must 
prove that the hotel's negligence 
was the proximate cause of the 
accident. Id at 154, 642 A.2d 
at 229. Thereafter, the court 
further questioned whether Grif-
fin's negligent operation of the 
van broke the chain of causation 
flowing from the hotel's negli-
gence. Id. at 157,642 A.2d at 
230. Recognizing the signifi-
cance of proximate and super-
seding causation, the court held 
that "while the negligence of 
[the hotel] clearly was the prox-
imate cause of the theft of the 
van, it does not follow that the 
causal relationship continued 
from the moment of the theft to 
the moment of impact between 
the van and Wewer's car." Id 
at 160, 642 A.2d at 232. 
The court concluded its 
analysis by determining that the 
hotel's negligence in leaving the 
keys in the ignition of the van 
was not the proximate cause of 
Wewer's injuries but merely the 
proximate cause of theft of the 
van. Hence, the court deter-
mined that: 
[A ]lthough an injury might not 
have occurred "but for" an an-
.RECENT 
tecedent act of the defendant, 
liability may not be imposed if 
. . . the negligence of one person 
is merely passive and potential, 
while the negligence of another 
is the moving and effective cause 
ofthe injury ... [o]r ifthe injury 
is so remote in time and space 
from defendant's original negli-
gence and another's negligence 
intervenes. 
Id at 156, 642 A.2d at 230 
(citations omitted). 
The court in Hartford 
Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn resolves 
the question of whether the 
State's duty to protect against 
injuries to third parties over-
rides the general tort law princi-
ple concerning the effect of su-
perseding, intervening acts on 
legal or proximate causation. 
Specifically, the court avers that 
liability of an initial negligent 
actor cannot lie where his acts 
are not the moving and effective 
cause of the resulting injury . 
Rather, such intervening acts 
supersede the initial negligent 
act and become the proximate 
cause of the injury. More im-
portantly, this general tort law 
principle is recognized even if 
the negligent acts of another 
amount to the intervening agen-
cy which results in injury to a 
third party for which the State 
would otherwise have a duty to 
protect. 
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